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ABSTRACT 
More firms are now disseminating financial information via the internet, and digital 
technology allows firms to communicate in a more interactive manner compared to 
traditional paper-based communication channels. Further, various levels of interactivity 
exist even within online communication channels. We conduct an experiment to examine 
how online communication channel interactivity affects investor information processing, 
as evidenced by investors’ reactions to managers’ linguistic choices within financial 
disclosures, i.e., term specificity (firm-specific versus general terms) and language 
extremity (moderately versus extremely positive language). We find that a more 
interactive channel causes investors to be more sensitive to managers’ linguistic choices, 
and there is an interactive effect of term specificity and language extremity on investment 
willingness. Specifically, when managers use moderately (extremely) positive language, 
investors are more (less) willing to invest in a company with its financial disclosures 
containing firm-specific (versus general) terms. However, such an interactive effect is 
much weaker when the communication channel is less interactive. Our findings are 
important for investors, managers, and regulators to understand how investors’ 
perceptions and investment decisions could be changed when information is 
communicated via a more interactive channel.   
 
 
 
 
		
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms are increasingly disseminating information via the internet, causing 
investors to rely more heavily on online communication channels to acquire financial 
information (e.g., Ettredge, Richardson, and Scholz 2002; Antweiler and Frank 2004; 
Blankespoor, Miller, and White 2014; Lerman 2017; Blankespoor 2018). Compared to 
more traditional communication modes (e.g. printed materials), online communication 
channels enable firms to provide richer and more interactive content to stakeholders, 
creating a more active experience for users (e.g., Hoffman and Novak 1996). With 
companies disseminating financial disclosures via various communication channels (e.g., 
firm investor relation websites, press releases, social media, and conference calls) and 
with different communication channels exhibiting different levels of interactivity, 
investors’ processing of financial disclosures, and accordingly their decisions, may be 
affected. In this study, we examine whether and how online communication channel 
interactivity (hereafter, “channel interactivity”) affects investors’ processing of 
management’s financial disclosures.  
Understanding the influence of channel interactivity on investors’ processing of 
management’s financial disclosures is important because channel interactivity does not 
change information content and, thus, should not affect investors’ perceptions and 
judgments. However, research suggests that more interactive channels increase users’ 
attention to detail, because they are more cognitively stimulating (e.g., Reeves and Nass 
2000; Kiss and Esch 2006; Sundar 2012). Hence, it is possible that if investors obtain 
financial disclosures from more interactive channels, it may cause investors to be more 
sensitive to details within the financial disclosures than they otherwise may be. One such 
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detail is management’s linguistic style in qualitative disclosures, which has been shown 
to influence investors’ judgments and decisions beyond quantitative information (e.g., 
Hales, Kuang, and Venkataraman 2011; Rennekamp 2012; Tan, Wang, and Zhou 2015; 
Asay, Elliott, Rennekamp 2016; Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018a; Koonce, Leitter, 
and White 2018). We identify two linguistic choices that management uses in financial 
statement disclosures that have not received much attention in the literature – language 
extremity and term specificity – and investigate how channel interactivity influences 
investors’ reactions to these two linguistic choices. 
Language extremity refers to the strength of the descriptive words used without 
changing the underlying tone (e.g., Craig and Blankenship 2011).1 In referring to 
language extremity, it can range from neutral (neither positive or negative) to moderate to 
extreme. For example, when management refers to a new product, they can use a number 
of adjectives that vary in extremity but all convey a positive tone, such as “our new 
competitive product” (moderately positive) versus “our new exceptional product” 
(extremely positive). Bochkay, Chava, and Hales (2018) find that there is variation in 
managers’ language extremity choices in their communication with investors. Further, 
Bochkay et al. (2018) find that there is greater movement in stock prices and trading 
volume when extreme language is used within conference calls, suggesting that extreme 
language changes investor perceptions and generates disagreement among investors. 
However, it is unclear from Bochkay et al. (2018) whether and when investors are more 
	
1 Language extremity has historically been studied as one component of two larger linguistic constructs: 
intensity (e.g., Bowers 1963; Hamilton and Hunter 1998) and vividness (e.g., Hales et al. 2011). Recently, 
the literature breaks out language extremity by specifically looking at the linguistic components that 
magnify the extremity of the message without changing the emotionality of the message (Craig and 
Blankenship 2011).  
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convinced by the extremely positive language used in management disclosures.2 One 
factor that could moderate a positive language extremity effect is term specificity. 
Term specificity refers to the extent to which firm-specific terms are used in 
describing a product, such as using “iPhone” (high term specificity), compared to more 
general or generic terms, such as “cell phone” (low term specificity). Investors encounter 
wide variation in term specificity in financial information. For example, Nike uses firm-
specific terms such as “Converse” and “Jordan Brand,” whereas Puma uses more generic 
terms such as “footwear” in their earnings releases (see Appendix A for more examples). 
Managers concurrently use both linguistic features (language extremity and term 
specificity) in financial disclosures, but their interactive effects on investors’ decision-
making is unexplored and may not be intuitive to management.  
We develop our hypotheses based on theory and prior research. Prior literature 
shows investors prefer more-detailed to less-detailed information (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, 
and Venkataraman 2007; Elliott, Rennekamp, and White 2015), as more-detailed 
information makes it easier for individuals to visualize the information (Semin and 
Fiedler 1988, 1991). Further, being able to visualize the information increases the 
believability of the message (Hansen and Wänke 2010). Thus, we predict that with 
moderately positive language (i.e. positive language but not to an extreme degree), 
investors will react more favorably when management uses firm-specific terms compared 
to general terms.  
	
2 Language extremity occurs within both positive and negative tones. In this study, we examine the effect 
of language extremity within a positive tone, as managers want to highlight positive performance in 
disclosures (Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018b). Thus, managers are more likely to use extremely 
positive language to highlight favorable information and less likely to use extremely negative language to 
downplay unfavorable information (Bochkay et al. 2018).  
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Unlike moderately positive language, extremely positive language is likely to 
cause investors to question the validity of management disclosures (Craig and 
Blankenship 2011; Bochkay et al. 2018). As managers are motivated to portray firm 
performance opportunistically (e.g., Bernard and Skinner 1996; Bamber, Hui, and Yeung 
2010), extreme positivity in the narrative could be perceived as supportive of, or 
consistent with, management’s incentives (Tan, Wang, and Zhou 2014). Psychology 
research conjectures that when the validity of the information is questioned, individuals 
prefer less-detailed information to more-detailed information because the latter appears 
contrived (Johnson, Bush, and Mitchell 1998). Thus, we predict that investors will react 
more favorably to general terms (as opposed to firm-specific terms) when management 
concurrently uses extremely positive language in their disclosures.  
Additionally, we expect that this effect of language extremity and term specificity 
will be moderated by channel interactivity. A more interactive channel requires additional 
sensory exchanges between the user and the content (e.g., Reeves and Nass 2000; Kiss 
and Esch 2006; Sundar 2012; Xu and Sundar 2016), increasing cognitive stimulation and 
leading to greater processing of information (e.g., Severin 1967; Braeshears, Akers, and 
Smith 2005). As a result, we expect investors will be more sensitive to linguistic features 
(and thus a stronger joint effect of language extremity and term specificity on investors’ 
judgments) when investors access financial disclosures via a more interactive channel 
than a less interactive channel.  
We conduct a 2 ´ 2 ´ 2 between-participants experiment, manipulating channel 
interactivity (i.e., more or less interactive), term specificity within the earnings release 
(i.e., firm-specific or general terms), and language extremity within the earnings release 
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(i.e., moderately or extremely positive language). We use MBA students as proxies for 
nonprofessional investors. After reviewing background information of a fictitious firm, 
participants view the firm’s online platform where we manipulate channel interactivity. 
Next, we inform participants that the firm just released its quarterly earnings, and we 
provide participants with the related earnings release, in which we include our term 
specificity and language extremity manipulations. Participants subsequently provide their 
willingness to invest in the firm and answer post-experimental questions.  
Our findings are consistent with our predictions. We find that the joint effect of 
term specificity and language extremity on investors’ investment willingness decisions is 
much stronger in the more (versus less) interactive channel condition. Specifically, in the 
more interactive channel condition, we find that when management uses moderately 
positive language, investors are more willing to invest in the firm when its disclosure 
contains firm-specific terms compared to general terms. However, when management 
uses extremely positive language, investors are more willing to invest in the firm when its 
disclosure contains general terms than firm-specific terms. Further, we find that the 
interaction effect of term specificity and language extremity in the more interactive 
channel condition is fully mediated by participants’ credibility perceptions. In contrast, 
we find that investors do not react to managers’ linguistic choices in the less interactive 
channel condition.  
Our study contributes to the academic literature, regulation, and practice. First, we 
add to the emerging literature on how characteristics of communication channels 
influence investors’ judgments. Interactivity has been identified as one of the main 
distinguishing features of online communication channels compared to traditional paper-
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based media (Liu and Shrum 2002; Sundar 2012). Our study contributes to the literature 
by demonstrating that more interactive channels stimulate investors, making them more 
sensitive to management linguistic choices within financial disclosures disseminated 
through such channels. This suggests that when companies disseminate information via 
more interactive channels, managers need to be aware of such influences and deliberate 
on their disclosure decisions. Managers should be especially cognizant of their language 
choices as those choices may have a greater impact on investor judgments than they 
would otherwise have when financial disclosures are disseminated through a less 
interactive channel or traditional paper-based channels.  
Further, our results add to the literature on term specificity and language 
extremity by demonstrating that the effect of term specificity is conditional on language 
extremity, and vice versa. Prior literature corroborates the SEC’s guidelines that 
encourage managers to use more detailed, concrete terms whenever possible (e.g., SEC 
1998; Elliott et al. 2015). While our results support such a recommendation when 
managers use moderately positive language in their disclosures, we also find a 
contrasting effect of term specificity (i.e., investors prefer general to firm-specific terms) 
when managers use extremely positive language in their disclosures. Additionally, our 
findings suggest that extremely positive language may result in stronger stock market 
reactions only when information is communicated via a more interactive channel and 
when general terms are used, but not otherwise. Managers and standard setters should be 
aware of the joint effect of language extremity and term specificity on investors’ 
credibility assessments as well as their investment willingness judgments, as our results 
suggest that the use of firm-specific (versus general) terms could be considered as less 
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credible and decrease investment willingness when managers concurrently use extremely 
positive language and communicate via more interactive channels.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews relevant 
research and develops our hypotheses. Sections III and IV present our experimental 
design and results. Finally, section V offers conclusions and limitations to our study. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
With the development of digital technology, investors can now obtain financial 
information from online communication channels, such as websites, social media 
platforms, and discussion boards (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2002; Antweiler and Frank 2004; 
Blankespoor et al. 2014; Lerman 2017). The use of these online communication channels 
is now an important form of communication for firms, and an important channel for 
investors to obtain financial information (e.g., Blankespoor 2018).  
Online communication channels change the way investors acquire and process 
information compared to traditional communication channels, such as paper-based 
mediums (Blankespoor et al. 2014). One of the main differences between traditional and 
online communication channels is the level of channel interactivity (e.g., Liu and Shrum 
2002; Sundar 2012). Channel interactivity is a multi-dimensional construct that deals 
with attracting the user’s attention and involving them in the flow of information (e.g., 
Sundar, Kalyanaraman, and Brown 2003; Chen and Yen 2004; Sundar 2012). Two key 
components of channel interactivity are vividness and involvement (e.g., Steuer 1992; 
Coyle and Thorson 2001; Sundar 2012).3 Vividness is the richness of the features in the 
	
3 As channel interactivity is a multi-dimensional construct, the literature has investigated numerous 
dimensions and characteristics of interactivity such as playfulness, connectedness, choice, direction of 
communication, time flexibility, speed of interaction, and level of control (e.g., Liu and Shrum 2002; Chen 
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communication channel, which can be achieved through characteristics such as vibrant 
colors and animations (e.g., Drèze and Hussherr 2003; Goodrich 2011; de Vries, 
Grensler, and Leeflang 2012). Involvement refers to the use of features in the 
communication channel that allow users to actively engage with the communication 
channel. For example, a communication channel with a poll or a hyperlink is considered 
interactive as it provides user involvement and engagement  (e.g., Fortin and Dholakia 
2005). Also, the use of multiple senses (such as vision, audio, motion) enhances user 
involvement. This advancement in technology enables online communication channels to 
provide richer and more active experiences for users.   
Variations in channel interactivity have the potential to influence investors’ 
response to financial information obtained through these channels. More interactive 
channels increase the number of sensory exchanges between the user and the channel 
(e.g., Reeves and Nass 2000; Kiss and Esch 2006; Sundar 2012; Xu and Sundar 2016). 
Cue summation theory finds that an increase in sensory exchanges increases cognitive 
stimulation leading to greater learning of the content (e.g., Garner 1970; Severin 1968; 
Braeshears et al. 2005). For example, in education, more interactive lessons in the 
classroom increase students’ stimulation, thus increasing their learning associated with 
the content (e.g., Rosegard and Wilson 2013). Additionally, a common strategy among 
presenters is to start with a “hook” to peak the audiences’ interest (e.g., Willis 2006). 
This hook stimulates the audience allowing the presenter to hold the audiences’ attention 
for the main presentation and increase their processing and learning of the information in 
the main presentation.  	
and Yen 2004; Downes and McMillan 2000; Ha and James 1998). We focus on two aspects of interactivity, 
vividness and involvement, which are recurring themes in the literature. 
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Additionally, persuasion literature suggests that individuals process information 
in more detail when they have high (opposed to low) involvement (Petty and Cacioppo 
1986). For example, individuals are more likely to differentiate strong arguments from 
weak arguments when they are more involved with the issue than when they are not 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Further, recent accounting findings suggest that the increased 
processing is persistent between tasks. Austin and Carpenter (2019) find that auditors 
who read a more engaging email (and thus are more involved) prior to performing audit 
test work are more likely to identify subtle fraud risks in the audit work papers compared 
to those who read a less engaging email. Thus, we expect more interactive 
communication channels will cause investors to be more engaged and involved in the 
information processing of financial disclosures.  
Channel Interactivity and Linguistic Cues 
Prior research finds a variety of non-numerical language choices influence 
investors’ judgments and decisions (see Loughran and McDonald [2016] for a review). 
One such linguistic choice is managements’ tone (e.g., Tan et al. 2014). Within messages 
with positive tone, managers can use different language to change the extremity of the 
tone. In fact, Bochkay et al. (2018) find there is variation in managers’ language 
extremity choices in conference calls. Additionally, Bochkay et al. (2018) develop a 
linguistic extremity dictionary with “Level 1” words being moderately positive, or the 
least extreme, and “Level 5” words being extremely positive. For example, when 
management refers to a new product, they can use a number of adjectives that convey a 
positive tone but vary in extremity such as, “our new competitive product” versus “our 
new exceptional product”. Competitive is rated on the bottom end of the positive tone 
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scale (Level 1) compared to exceptional, which is rated at the top end of the positive tone 
scale (Level 5). 
When management uses moderately positive language in their disclosures, prior 
research suggests investors will prefer more detailed, concrete information to less 
detailed, abstract information (e.g., Hirst et al. 2007; Elliott et al. 2015). Compared to 
abstract terms, which refer to a greater set of possibilities, concrete terms refer to a more 
limited set of possibilities allowing for easier visualization of the information (Semin and 
Fiedler 1988, 1991). The ability to envision information influences receivers’ perceptions 
of the information (Sedor 2002; Kadous, Krische, and Sedor 2006; Douglas and Sutton 
2006; Wigboldus and Douglas 2007). For example, Sedor (2002) shows that analysts 
have more favorable forecasts when provided with scenario information that facilitates 
visualization than when information is presented in a bullet-point format. Hansen and 
Wänke (2010) also find that individuals perceive a message with concrete terms as more 
believable than a message with abstract terms because the concrete terms are easier to 
visualize. In our study, firm-specific terms more concretely refer to a unique item within 
the firm compared to general terms. Investors can visualize firm-specific terms when they 
process relevant information, leading to more favorable credibility assessments and, thus, 
greater investment willingness than with general terms.  
 Management also uses extremely positive language as they have incentives to 
report opportunistically (e.g., Bernard and Skinner 1996; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh 
2002; Bamber et al. 2010; Bochkay et al. 2018). Extreme language magnifies the 
message tone and viewpoint conveyed to readers (Hamilton and Stewart 1993; Craig and 
Blankenship 2011). With an extremely positive worded financial disclosure, investors 
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may question the validity of the message, as positive language is consistent with 
managements’ incentives to appear competent, successful, and optimistic about the 
future. Prior studies find that when disclosures are consistent with management 
incentives, investors may question the validity of the information (Lang and Lundholm 
2000; Tan et al. 2014). Accordingly, when message validity is questioned, individuals are 
more likely to believe a message with less detailed information compared to a message 
with more detailed information (Johnson et al. 1998). Previous research conjectures this 
is due to more detailed information appearing contrived (Johnson et al. 1998). As such, 
investors may perceive extremely positive language with more detailed language as less 
believable than extremely positive language with less detailed language due to 
management trying to present an inaccurate representation of reality. Therefore, we 
predict that, when firms use extremely positive language, general terms will lead to 
higher investment willingness compared to firm-specific terms.   
 When financial disclosures are disseminated via a less interactive communication 
channel, prior research suggests investors will be less sensitive to details in the financial 
disclosures (e.g., Reeves and Nass 2000). As such, we expect investors will be less 
influenced by the language management uses in the financial disclosure. We predict with 
less channel interactivity, the joint effect of language extremity and term specificity on 
investors’ investment willingness will be dampened compared to settings with more 
channel interactivity. This leads to our hypothesis, which is graphically presented in 
Figure 1. 
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Hypothesis:  When provided with a firm’s financial performance information, 
investors are more willing to invest when firm management uses firm-specific 
terms (general terms) with moderately positive (extremely positive) language. 
This interactive effect is greater when the information is provided via a more 
interactive communication channel, versus a less interactive channel. 
  
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
III. METHOD 
Participants 
Our participants are 227 MBA students from a large U.S. university who received 
extra credit in exchange for participating in the study. On average, the participants have 
15.62 years of working experience and have taken 3.34 accounting and finance courses. 
Approximately 82.7 percent of our participants have stock investment experience, 80.9 
percent have experience reading earnings releases, 80.4 percent have experience reading 
annual reports, and 36.3 percent are female. Our participants are good proxies for 
nonprofessional investors because they have similar characteristics and experience as 
those in Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk (2007).  
Procedure 
Participants assume the role of an investor and read background information 
(including historical financial data) for ABC Co., a hypothetical technology-
manufacturing firm. Next, participants view the firm’s online platform, where we 
manipulate communication interactivity within six posts that relate to the firm and it’s 
products.4 After reviewing the online platform, participants are informed that ABC Co. 
just released third quarter earnings and view the most recent earnings release. We 
	
4 To ensure all participants view the online platform, participants are required to enter a code provided on 
the bottom of the online platform page to continue the experiment in Qualtrics.	
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manipulate language extremity and term specificity within the earnings release. After 
reading the earnings release, we ask participants to indicate “To what extent are you 
willing to invest in ABC’s stock” on a scale from 0 (“Not at all Willing”) to 10 (“Very 
Willing”). Participants finish the experiment with post-experimental and demographic 
questions.  
Experimental Design  
We conduct a 2 (more versus less interactive channel) x 2 (firm-specific versus 
general terms) x 2 (moderately versus extremely positive language) between-participants 
experiment. In order to manipulate channel interactivity, we leverage prior research and 
focus on the vividness and involvement of the content on the platform (e.g., Sundar, 
Narayan, Obregon, and Uppal 1998; Reeves and Nass 2000; Sundar 2000; Sundar 2012). 
Vivid content is visually engaging, such as animations or videos (e.g., de Vries et al. 
2012). Involving content is defined as the ability of the user to act on the content such as 
click a link, respond to a poll, or answer a question (e.g., Coursaris, Van Osch, and 
Balogh 2013). In the more interactive condition, we add one interactive feature to each 
post on the firm’s online platform. In the less interactive condition, the post just includes 
plain text. For example, one post is about the firm’s top three products chosen by 
consumers. In the more interactive condition, a poll is also included in the post. 
Participants can cast their vote for one of the three products.5 The poll provides an 
opportunity for the participant to respond, increasing the interactivity of the post. In the 
less interactive condition, the text was the only content included in the post. Another post 
describes one of the firm’s products, a high-speed processor, and jokes about how 	
5 In the experimental instrument, all features described as part of the more interactive manipulation are 
functional for the participant so that they can experience our channel interactivity manipulation.  
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everything in your life should not slow you down. In the less interactive condition, only 
the text description is shown. In the more interactive condition, in addition to the same 
text description in the less interactive condition, a video clip of a man stuck in traffic 
from a popular movie is also included in the post. The video is a dynamic, visually 
engaging feature, which increases the interactivity of the post. A third post provides 
information about telecommuting. In the more interactive condition, a snippet of 
information appears in the post and users are instructed to click the link to read the full 
article.6 By instructing the participant to click the link, this provides a directive for the 
participant to perform an action, increasing the interactivity of the post. In the less 
interactive condition, the linked content appears directly in the post. See Appendix B for 
additional manipulation examples.  
 We manipulate language extremity and term specificity within the earnings 
release. For language extremity, we hold constant the earnings numbers while only 
varying the adjectives used to describe the numbers. In all conditions, management’s 
overall tone is positive, and we vary the extremity of the positive language. We utilize the 
language extremity dictionary developed in Bochkay et al. (2018) to design our 
manipulation. The dictionary in Bochkay et al. (2018) has extreme language ranked from 
1 (moderate) to 5 (extreme) for both positive and negative valence language. Consistent 
with the categorization used in Bochkay et al. (2018), we use language from Categories 4 
and 5 for our extremely positive language condition and Categories 1-3 for our 
moderately positive language condition. In the extremely positive language condition, 
management uses words such as “exceptional” and “superior”. In the moderately positive 	
6 The information included in the article is not firm specific nor is it financially relevant so this should have 
no effect on participants’ investment decisions in isolation.		
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condition, management uses descriptors such as “competitive” and “solid”. For example, 
the extremely positive language condition reads “ABC Co. Reports Exceptional Third 
Quarter Sales Growth” compared to the moderately positive condition that reads “ABC 
Co. Reports Competitive Third Quarter Sales Growth” (emphasis added).  
Lastly, we manipulate the descriptive words management uses to refer to the 
products in the earnings release. In the general term condition, the earnings release 
contains generic terms that are applicable across companies: printer, graphics card, and 
processor. In contrast, in the firm-specific term condition, the earnings release contains 
firm-specific terms: CAD 870D, V-Force 320CT, and Quad Core X2. Only these three 
terms are manipulated, but they are repeated throughout the earnings release in reference 
to these products. Appendix C provides the earnings release with our term specificity and 
language extreme manipulations.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
We checked the manipulation of channel interactivity by asking participants to 
indicate how stimulating the firm’s online platform is on a scale from -5 (“Not at all 
Stimulating”) to 5 (“Very Stimulating”). Participants in the more interactive condition 
were significantly more stimulated by the online platform content than those in the less 
interactive condition (means of -0.17 and -0.87, respectively, t1,224 = 3.440, p < 0.033, 
one-tailed), suggesting a successful manipulation.7 
We test the effectiveness of the language extremity manipulation by having 
	
7 All p-values are two-tailed unless specifically specified. 
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participants indicate how extreme the CEO is when referring to the firm’s performance 
and products on a scale of -5 (“Very Unfavorable”) to 5 (“Very Favorable”). As we 
manipulate language extremity within a positive tone, we expect participants to use the 
positive side of the scale. Consistent with the manipulation, all participants except six 
(out of 227) rate the language on the positive side of the scale indicating participants 
perceive the overall tone as positive.8 Additionally, participants in the extremely positive 
language condition rate the CEO’s comments significantly more favorable than those in 
the moderately positive language condition (means of 3.75 and 3.01, respectively, t1,225 = 
12.296, p < 0.001, one-tailed).  
Finally, to ensure a successful manipulation of term specificity, we ask 
participants to indicate how specific the firm is in the earnings release when referring to 
their products with endpoints -5 (“Very General”) to 5 (“Very Specific”). Participants in 
the firm-specific condition rate the firm to be more specific than those in the general 
condition (means of 2.40 and -0.28, respectively, t1,225 = 55.118, p < 0.001, one-tailed), 
indicating a successful manipulation of term specificity.  
Tests of Hypothesis 
 Our hypothesis predicts that investors will prefer firm-specific terms when 
management uses moderately positive language, but they will prefer general terms when 
management uses extremely positive language. Additionally, we predict that investors 
will be less sensitive to management’s linguistic choices in the earnings release when 
they are in the less interactive channel condition compared to when they are in the more 
interactive channel condition, suggesting a three-way interaction of channel interactivity, 
	
8 We retain all participants in the analysis. However, results remain consistent if we drop these participants.   
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language extremity, and term specificity. We conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
for participants’ investment willingness, with channel interactivity, language extremity, 
and term specificity as the independent variables. The results are shown in Table 1. Panel 
A shows the descriptive statistics of participants’ investment decisions, and the ANOVA 
results are shown in Panel B. Figure 2 presents graphical results. Table 1 Panel B shows a 
significant three-way interaction (F1,219 = 4.746; p = 0.030), supporting H1.9  
<INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 1 HERE> 
To provide further support for H1, we analyze the joint effect of term specificity 
and language extremity in the more and less interactive channel conditions, respectively. 
We expect that with a more interactive channel, participants prefer firm-specific terms 
compared to general terms when management uses moderately positive language; 
however, when management uses extremely positive language, participants prefer general 
terms to firm-specific terms. Consistent with our prediction, as shown in Table 2 Panel A, 
the test for the predicted interaction of term specificity and language extremity in the 
more interactive channel condition is statistically significant (F1,107 = 4.314; p = 0.040).10 
As shown in Table 2 Panel C, simple effects tests show that the results are in the direction 
predicted. Specifically, with moderately positive language, participants are more willing 	
9 As more interactive channels can increase individuals’ affective responses, we also run this analysis 
including a post-experimental positive affect measure as a covariate. We ask participants to indicate the 
extent the company made them feel happy and pleased on a scale from 0 (“Not at All”) to 10 (“Very 
Much”). We create a composite variable including both responses because they are highly correlated (r = 
.909, p < .001 and Cronbach’s alpha = 0.952). While the positive affect measure yields a significant result, 
the three-way interaction also remains significant after controlling for the affect measure. Thus, our results 
cannot be explained by positive affect.  
10 We also test the interaction of term specificity x language extremity in the more interactive condition 
using a contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional ANOVA interaction term weights, we assign 
contrast weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions within the more interactive condition: firm-
specific and moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and extreme, and general and extreme, 
respectively. Additionally, we assign zero weights to the less interactive condition. Results are consistent 
with the traditional ANOVA interaction term showing a significant interaction (F1,219 = 4.520, p = 0.035). 
The result is reported in Table 2 Panel B. 
		 18 
to invest when firm-specific terms are used compared to when general terms are used 
(mean = 6.27 and 5.52, respectively; F1,219 = 1.868, p = 0.087, one-tailed). Conversely, 
with extremely positive language, participants are more willing to invest when general 
terms are used compared to when firm-specific terms are used (mean = 6.93 and 6.04, 
respectively; F1,219 = 2.693, p = 0.051, one-tailed). These results are consistent with our 
predictions.  
Additionally, as shown in Table 2 Panel D, we find that with general terms, there 
is a statistically significant difference between the moderately and extremely positive 
language conditions (mean = 5.52 and 6.93, respectively; F1,219 = 6.985, p = 0.009). This 
finding is consistent with Bochkay et al. (2018) that shows investors react stronger when 
extreme language is used than when moderate language is used. In contrast, with firm 
specific terms, we do not find a significant difference between the moderately and 
extremely positive language conditions (mean = 6.27 and 6.04, respectively; F1,219 = 
0.172, p = 0.679). This result suggests that firm-specific terms could minimize the impact 
of language extremity on investors’ reactions, establishing a boundary condition for the 
language extremity effect documented in Bochkay et al. (2018).  
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
In contrast, our hypothesis predicts the effects of language extremity and term 
specificity are smaller with a less interactive channel. Table 3 Panel A shows a non-
significant interaction of term specificity and language extremity (F1,112 = 0.931; p = 
0.337).11 Additionally, as reported in Table 3 Panel C, when managers use moderately 
	
11 Similar to the more interactive condition, we also test the interaction of term specificity x language 
extremity in the less interactive condition using a contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional 
ANOVA interaction term weights, we assign contrast weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions 
within the less interactive condition: firm-specific and moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and 
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positive language, the simple effect of firm-specific terms and general terms is not 
significant (mean = 5.61 and 5.89, respectively; F1,219 = 0.263, p = 0.609). Further, when 
managers use extremely positive language, the simple effect of firm-specific terms and 
general terms is also not significant (mean = 6.40 and 5.97, respectively; F1,219 = 0.687, p 
= 0.408). Similarly, as tabulated in Table 3 Panel D, there is also no significant effect of 
language extremity when managers use general terms (mean = 5.89 and 5.97, 
respectively; F1,219 = 0.022, p = 0.883) or firm-specific terms (mean = 5.61 and 6.40, 
respectively; F1,219 = 2.194, p = 0.140). These results are consistent with our expectation 
that investors are less sensitive to managers’ linguistic choices when they access 
management disclosures via a less interactive channel.  
< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
Overall, these results support our prediction that the channel interactivity in which 
financial disclosures are released influences investors’ processing, as evidenced by 
investors’ responses to managements’ linguistic choices within the financial disclosure. 
Specifically, investors have a stronger reaction to the linguistic choices when there is a 
more interactive channel compared to a less interactive channel.  
Mediation Analysis 
 Our theory suggests that when management uses a more interactive channel, 
managements’ linguistic choices will influence investors’ investment decisions, which 
will be mediated by their credibility assessment, as illustrated in Figure 3. To capture 
management credibility, we ask participants to assess management’s competence and 
	
extreme, and general and extreme, respectively. Additionally, we assign zero weights to the more 
interactive condition. Results are consistent with the traditional ANOVA interaction term showing a non-
significant interaction (F1,219 = 0.888, p = 0.347). The result is reported in Table 3 Panel B.	
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trustworthiness, on 11-point scales. Both questions are coded with “-5” indicating “not at 
all competent/trustworthy” and “5” indicating “very competent/trustworthy.” The 
reliability analysis shows the two measures are highly correlated (r = .807, p < .001 and 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.906). Thus, we use the average of participants’ responses to these 
two measures to capture their assessments of management credibility (Mercer 2004).  
We conduct a three-way ANOVA for participants’ assessment of management 
credibility, with channel interactivity, language extremity, and term specificity as the 
independent variables. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4 Panel A, and the 
ANOVA results are shown in Table 4 Panel B. We find a marginally significant three-
way interaction effect (F 1,217 = 2.862; p = 0.092), which has a similar pattern as our main 
DV (i.e., investment willingness). Additionally, in the more interactive condition, we find 
a marginally significant two-way interaction effect of term specificity and language 
extremity (F = 3.453, p = 0.065).12 In the less interactive condition, we find a non-
significant two-way interaction effect of term specificity and language extremity (F = 
0.264, p = 0.608).13  
To test for mediation, we run Hayes’ PROCESS Model 8 for 1,000 bootstrapped 
confidence intervals for participants’ investment willingness in the more interactive 
condition ( Preacher and Hayes 2008; Hayes 2009, 2013). We find that the overall model 
	
12 We test the interaction of term specificity x language extremity in the more interactive condition using a 
contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional ANOVA interaction term weights, we assign contrast 
weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions within the more interactive condition: firm-specific and 
moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and extreme, and general and extreme, respectively. 
Additionally, we assign zero weights to the less interactive condition.  
13 Similar to the more interactive condition, we test the interaction of term specificity x language extremity 
in the less interactive condition using a contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional ANOVA 
interaction term weights, we assign contrast weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions within the 
less interactive condition: firm-specific and moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and extreme, 
and general and extreme, respectively. Additionally, we assign zero weights to the more interactive 
condition.	
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is fully mediated by participants’ credibility assessments, as 90% of the confidence 
interval excludes zero (i.e., one-tailed bootstrapped estimates are < - 0.156). As shown in 
Figure 3, the overall negative effect is a product of (1) the negative link between the 
interaction of term specificity x language extremity and credibility (a = -0.314, p = 0.036) 
and (2) the positive link between credibility and investment willingness (b = 0.658, p < 
0.001). Additionally, we find that the mediated path is in the predicted direction. We find 
a positive indirect effect of term specificity in the moderately positive language condition 
through credibility (b = 0.249, 90% of the confidence interval excludes zero, i.e., one-
tailed bootstrapped estimates > 0.032). We also find a negative indirect effect of term 
specificity in the extremely positive language condition through credibility (b = - 0.164, 
90% of the confidence interval excludes zero, i.e., one-tailed bootstrapped estimates < 
0.008). Further, the direct effect of the interaction of term specificity x language extremity 
on investment willingness becomes insignificant after controlling for credibility (b = -
0.142, p = 0.389), consistent with full mediation. Thus, consistent with our theory, the 
mediation results suggest that when investors access management disclosures via a more 
interactive channel, managers’ linguistic choices will affect participants’ credibility 
assessments, which in turn influence their investment willingness decisions.  
< INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Digital technology allows firms to communicate in a more interactive manner 
through online communication channels compared to traditional, paper based channels. 
Firms are increasingly using online communication channels to disseminate financial 
information. Hence, it is important to understand how channel interactivity influences 
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investors’ sensitivity to financial information, and their investment decisions. As prior 
research finds investors are influenced by managements’ linguistic choices, in this study, 
we examine how channel interactivity influences investors’ information processing in 
response to two linguistic choices used by management: language extremity and term 
specificity. Our study finds that a more interactive communication channel causes 
investors to be more reactive to language in an earnings release compared to a less 
interactive communication channel. Specifically, we find that investors are more willing 
to invest with firm-specific terms, compared to general terms, when management uses 
moderately positive language. However, when management concurrently uses extremely 
positive language, investors are more willing to invest with general terms, compared to 
firm-specific terms. We find that these results are driven by investors’ credibility 
assessments. There are no significant differences in investors’ willingness to invest 
decisions based on language extremity or term specificity when management uses a less 
interactive communication channel. 
We contribute to the literature on how characteristics of the online 
communication channel influence investors’ decisions. Our study finds that more channel 
interactivity makes investors more sensitive to managements’ linguistic choices within 
financial disclosures. This finding has implications for firms when disseminating 
information through more interactive channels as seemingly minor word choices may 
have significant effects on investors’ decision-making. As online communication 
channels are become increasingly popular, our research suggests that managers need to 
be careful when making linguistic choices, as their choices may have greater impact on 
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investor reactions when investors access management disclosures through more 
interactive channels.  
Our findings also contribute to the linguistic literature on language extremity. We 
find that in the more interactive channel condition, our results are consistent with archival 
research showing that extreme language in conference calls (i.e., a more interactive 
communication channel) affects investor judgment and decision-making (Bochkay et al. 
2018), but only when management uses general language. We find that there is no 
language extremity effect when management uses firm-specific language even in the 
more interactive channel condition. More importantly, our findings in the less interactive 
channel condition suggest that the language extremity effect may not exist in a traditional 
paper-based financial reporting setting, establishing a boundary condition for the 
language extremity effect.  
Further, this study also adds to our understanding on the impact of firm-specific 
language on investors’ reactions. Our study shows a boundary condition to prior literature 
and the SEC handbook that establishes concrete terms are preferred to abstract terms. Our 
results show the effect of term specificity is moderated by language extremity. 
Specifically, investors prefer concrete terms when moderately positive language is used 
but prefer general terms when extremely positive language is used. Additionally, we 
provide evidence that such difference in investment willingness is driven by investors’ 
credibility assessment. This has important implications for management in choosing the 
language used in disclosures, as our study shows concrete terms are not always the best 
choice.  
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As with most studies, this study is subject to limitations. First, we manipulate 
channel interactivity with the use of vivid and involving features within the online 
platform posts. While these two features are key components of interactivity, research 
suggests there are other aspects of interactivity that are influential on users such as the 
speed of interaction (e.g., Ariely 2000; Sundar and Wagner 2002). Future research can 
examine these other factors and their influence on investors. Additionally, in order to 
retain internal validity, our simplified communication channel interactivity manipulation 
may not reach the level of channel interactivity of actual online channel. While we 
believe that the effect of channel interactivity will magnify as channel interactivity 
increases, future research is needed to determine whether too much channel interactivity 
will result in a different effect.  
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APPENDIX A 
Examples of Term Specificity within Earnings Releases 
 
Panel A: Examples of Generic Terms 
 
Puma discusses revenue related to footwear (i.e., general terms) within their Q1 2017 
earnings release. 
 
 
UnderArmour discusses revenue related to footwear, apparel, and accessories (i.e., 
generic terms) within their Q1 2017 earnings release. 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Examples of Term Specificity within Earnings Releases 
 
Panel B: Examples of Firm-Specific Terms 
 
Nike specifically discusses revenue related to NIKE Brand, Jordan Brand, and Converse 
(i.e., firm-specific terms) within their Q1 2017 earnings release. 
 
	  
 
Adidas specifically discusses revenue related to Adidas, Reebok, TaylorMade, and CCM 
Hockey (i.e., firm-specific terms) within their Q1 2017 earnings release. 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample manipulations of Channel Interactivity  
 
More Interactive Channel: 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
 Sample manipulations of Channel Interactivity  
 
Less Interactive Channel: 
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APPENDIX C  
  
Panel A: Earnings Release Example –Extremely Positive Language and Firm-
Specific Terms 
 
ABC CO. Reports Exceptional Third Quarter Sales Growth 
Portland, OR – February 3, 2017 - ABC Co. (NYSE: ABC) today announced terrific 
results for the quarter-ended January 30, 2016. “We are amazed with our incredible third 
quarter results” said CEO Alex Johnson. 
 
Compared to this quarter last year, net sales increased 3 percent to $19.8 billion for the 
November-January quarter mainly due to the increase in CAD 870D and V-Force 320CT 
sales. Gross margin declined 2.9 percent to 52.6 percent due to higher commodity costs 
and manufacturing costs for products such as the V-Force 320CT. Earnings per share was 
$1.08, an increase of half a percent. Earnings from continuing operations were $3.02 
billion, down 3 percent as costs increase and higher base-period acquisition gains.  
ABC’s comparable sale highlights for third quarter were as follows:  
 
CAD 870D: positive 9.8 percent versus positive 2.7 percent last year  
 
V-Force 320CT: positive 8.5 percent versus negative 1.3 percent last year  
 
 Chief Executive Officer Alex Johnson stated, “Our terrific sales were above plan, in 
large part due to the tremendous sales of the CAD 870D. This superior line has been 
exceptionally received by the market and continues to exceed expectations.  In addition, 
V-Force 320CT had amazing growth and the earnings were wonderful due to this top 
quality product.” 
 
Future Outlook 
Mr. Johnson concluded, “We executed several incredible initiatives during the quarter 
that have us extremely well positioned for the future. Our business strategy is to increase 
sales by expanding distribution of our superior brands, trialing our best products, and 
increasing purchase intent.” The Company is focused on escalating distribution of its 
superior products, building and maintaining exceptional relationships with its key 
distributors, and creating exceptional pioneering brands and products.  
According to Johnson, “With the release of our new top quality Quad Core X2 
technology, we expect sales to increase significantly in the last quarter of the fiscal year. 
This Quad Core X2 technology is superior to all the competition and has incredible 
potential in the market. We expect to have exceptional fiscal year results. ” 
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APPENDIX C (continued) 
 
Panel B: Earnings Release Language Extremity Manipulations 
 
Extremely Positive 
Language 
Moderately Positive 
Language 
Exceptional 
Terrific 
Amazed 
Incredible 
Tremendous 
Superior 
Exceed Expectations 
Wonderful 
Top Quality 
Extremely Well 
Best 
 
Competitive 
Improved 
Encouraged 
Solid 
Increased 
Quality 
Optimistically 
Grow 
Healthy 
Better 
Solid 
Advantageous 
  
 
Panel C: Earnings Release Term Specificity Manipulations 
 
Firm-Specific Term General Term 
CAD 870D 
V-Force 320CT 
Quad Core X2 
Printer 
Graphic Cards 
Processor 
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TABLE 1 
Analysis of Participants’ Investment Willingness 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviations) 
       
 
 More Interactive Channel   Less Interactive Channel  
Term 
Specificity 
Firm-
Specific 
General  Firm-
Specific 
General 
Moderate 
Language 
6.27 
(2.01) 
n=26 
5.52 
(2.44) 
n=29 
 5.61 
(2.00) 
n=28 
5.89 
(2.10) 
n=27 
 
Extreme 
Language 
 
6.04 
(1.93) 
n=27 
 
6.93 
(1.88) 
n=29 
  
6.40 
(1.83) 
n=30 
 
5.97 
(2.02) 
n=31 
 
      
 
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Results 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-
stat 
p-value 
Interactivity 2.806 1 2.806 0.676 0.412 
Specificity 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 0.994 
Extremity 14.908 1 14.908 3.593 0.059 
Interactivity x Specificity 0.303 1 0.303 0.073 0.787 
Interactivity x Extremity 0.340 1 0.340 0.082 0.775 
Specificity x Extremity  3.071 1 3.071 0.740 0.391 
Interactivity x Specificity x Extremity 19.694 1 19.694 4.746 0.030 
Error 908.695 219 4.149   
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participants are asked to indicate ‘‘[t]o what extent are you willing to invest in ABC’s stock’’ on an 11-
point scale, with endpoints 0 = ‘‘Not at all Willing’’ and 10 = ‘‘Very Willing.’’   
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________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 2 
More Interactive Channel 
Participants’ Investment Willingness 
 
Panel A: ANOVA Results 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Specificity 0.140 1 0.140 0.032 0.858 
Extremity 9.665 1 9.665 2.223 0.139 
Specificity x Extremity 18.754 1 18.754 4.314 0.040 
Error 465.182 107 4.347   
 
Panel B: Interaction Contrast a 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Specificity x Extremity 
 
18.754 
 
 
1 
 
 
18.754 
 
4.520 
 
 
0.035 
 
 
Panel C: Term Specificity  
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Moderate Language: Firm-
Specific > General 
Extreme Language: General > 
Firm-Specific 
7.752 
 
11.175 
1 
 
1 
7.752 
 
11.175 
1.868 
 
2.693 
0.087* 
 
0.051* 
 
Panel D: Language Extremity  
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Firm-Specific: Moderate vs. 
Extreme Language 
General: Moderate vs. Extreme 
Language 
 
0.714 
 
28.983 
1 
 
1 
0.714 
 
28.983 
0.172 
 
6.985 
0.679 
 
0.009 
Participants are asked to indicate ‘‘[t]o what extent are you willing to invest in ABC’s  stock’’ on an 11-
point scale, with endpoints 0 = ‘‘Not at all Willing’’ and 10 = ‘‘Very Willing.’’   
* One-tailed equivalent p-value reflects directional predictions. 
a  We also test the interaction of term specificity x language extremity in the more interactive condition 
using a contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional ANOVA interaction term weights, we assign 
contrast weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions within the more interactive condition: firm-
specific and moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and extreme, and general and extreme, 
respectively. Additionally, we assign zero weights to the less interactive condition.  
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TABLE 3 
Less Interactive Channel 
Participants’ Investment Willingness 
 
Panel A: ANOVA Results 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Specificity 0.164 1 0.164 0.041 0.839 
Extremity 5.493 1 5.493 1.387 0.241 
Specificity x Extremity 3.685 1 3.685 0.931 0.337 
Error 443.513 112 3.960   
 
Panel B: Interaction Contrast a 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Specificity x Extremity 
 
3.685 
 
 
1 
 
 
3.685 
 
0.888 
 
 
0.347 
 
 
Panel C: Term Specificity 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Moderate Language: Firm-
Specific > General 
Extreme Language: General > 
Firm-Specific 
1.091 
 
2.849 
1 
 
1 
1.091 
 
2.849 
0.263 
 
0.687 
0.609 
 
0.408 
      
 
Panel D: Language Extremity 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Firm-Specific: Moderate vs. 
Extreme Language  
General: Moderate vs. Extreme 
Language 
 
9.104 
 
0.090 
1 
 
1 
9.104 
 
0.090 
2.194 
 
0.022 
0.140 
 
0.883 
Participants are asked to indicate ‘‘[t]o what extent are you willing to invest in ABC’s  stock’’ on an 11-
point scale, with endpoints 0 = ‘‘Not at all Willing’’ and 10 = ‘‘Very Willing.’’  
a  We also test the interaction of term specificity x language extremity in the less interactive condition using 
a contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional ANOVA interaction term weights, we assign 
contrast weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions within the less interactive condition: firm-
specific and moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and extreme, and general and extreme, 
respectively. Additionally, we assign zero weights to the more interactive condition. 
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TABLE 4 
Analysis of Participants’ Management Credibility Assessments 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviations) 
       
 
 More Interactive Channel  Less Interactive Channel 
Term 
Specificity 
Firm-
Specific 
General  Firm-
Specific 
General 
Moderate 
Language 
6.98 
(2.06) 
n=25 
6.22 
(2.04) 
n=29 
 6.96 
(1.56) 
n=28 
6.46 
(1.61) 
n=27 
 
Extreme 
Language 
6.54 
(1.51) 
n=27 
7.04 
(1.51) 
n=28 
 6.47 
(1.78) 
n=30 
5.63 
(1.89) 
n=31 
 
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Results 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Interactivity 5.506 1 5.506 1.778 0.184 
Specificity 8.921 1 8.921 2.881 0.091 
Extremity 3.247 1 3.247 1.049 0.307 
Interactivity x Specificity 4.098 1 4.098 1.324 0.251 
Interactivity x Extremity 10.122 1 10.122 3.269 0.072 
Specificity x Extremity  2.952 1 2.952 0.954 0.330 
Interactivity x Specificity x Extremity 8.862 1 8.862 2.862 0.092 
Error 671.838 217 3.096   
 
Panel C: More Interactive Channel  
Source Sum of  
Squares 
df Mean  
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Specificity x Extremity a 10.690 
 
1 
 
10.690 
 
3.453 
 
0.065 
 
Panel D: Less Interactive Channel  
Source      Sum of  
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F-stat p-value 
Specificity and Extremity a 0.818 1 0.818 0.264 0.608 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Participants are asked to assess management’s competence and trustworthiness, on 11-point scales. Both 
questions are coded with “-5” indicating “not at all competent/trustworthy” and “5” indicating “very 
competent/trustworthy.” 
a  We test the interaction of term specificity x language extremity in the level of interactivity of interest 
using a contrast test with all eight cells. Using the traditional ANOVA interaction term weights, we assign 
contrast weights of (1, -1, -1, 1) to the following conditions within the level of interactivity of interest: 
firm-specific and moderate, general and moderate, firm-specific and extreme, and general and extreme, 
respectively. Additionally, we assign zero weights to the other level of interactivity. 
